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not to be prejudiced by the position of the accused on trial for crime.
It is so used in Massachusetts:
"the presumption of innocence means that the finding of
an indictment by the grand jury ... [is] not to be regarded as
circumstances tending to criminate the defendant or creating
against him unfavorable impressions, and that he is not to be
found guilty upon suspicion or conjecture but only upon evi-
dence produced in court."
52
But, while an instruction on the presumption of innocence may be an
aid to a fair trial, it is not a requisite to a fair trial. The test of the
fairness of the trial and conviction should be whether the correct
principles of the criminal law have been applied, and not whether
a particular word formula has been used to state those principles.
BaYcE REA, JR.
THE MORGAN CASE AS A THREAT TO THE FULL HEARING REQUIREMENT
IN RATE MAKING PROCEEDINGS
Once hailed as the champion of the "full hearing" doctrine in
administrative law, the Morgan case,' finally concluded at the last
term of the Supreme Court after eleven years of proceedings, stands
today as a serious threat to the entire function and purpose of that
principle.
Morgan,2 a sheep commissioner in Kansas City, had, since 1923,
charged for services in compliance with an order of the Secretary of
Agriculture.s In 193o, however, it came to the Secretary's attention
that Morgan's rates were too high. To remedy such impositions upon
mCommonwealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 151 N. E. 297, 300 (1926), quoting
from Commonwealth v. De Francesco, 248 Mass. 9, 142 N. E. 749, 75o , 34 A. L. IL 937,
938 (194).
Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 9o6, 8o L. ed. 1288 (1930); 23
F. Supp. 38o (1937); 3o4 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 82 L. ed. 1129 (1938); 304 U. S. 23
(1938); 24 F. Supp. 214 (1938); 307 U. S. 183, 59 S. Ct. 795, 83 L. ed. 1211 (1939); 32
F. Supp. 546 (194o); 61 S: Ct. 999 (1941). This extended litigation reached the
Supreme Court five times. (The citations to lower federal court cases refer to de-
cisons of the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri).
'Although the petitioners involved in this litigation consisted of several
marketing agencies doing business about Kansas City, it will facilitate the narra-
tion of the fact situation if they are referred to throughout the article as "Morgan."
'Hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary." "Several incumbents of the office
acted in the case at successive dates. The term Secretary is used to designate the
official who acted in any instance." United States v. Morgan, 61 S. Ct. 999, 1oo5
(1941)
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the public, the Secretary has power, under the Packers and Stock-
yards Act,4 to prescribe rates for the future. Under the Act, however,
two conditions are put upon the exercise of this power: (i) The Secre-
tary must be of the opinion that the existing rate is unjust, and (2)
this opinion must be the result of a "full hearing" accorded to the
commissioner.5
After three years of proceedings, the Secretary, in June, 1933,
ordered Morgan to charge a lower rate for his services. Pending his
attack on the validity of the Secretary's order, Morgan secured a tempor-
ary injunction against it's enforcement and thereafter paid the differ-
ence between the old and new rate into a Federal District Court to be
impounded until a final determination of the controversy should be
reached. To establish the plea that he had not been given a full hear-
ing, Morgan alleged that the Secretary had neither read nor heard the
evidence, argument, or brief, but had, nevertheless, (upon an assistant
performing the foregoing) undertaken to make the findings and fix
the rates. The Supreme Court held these allegations sufficient to require
an answer from the Secretary, and thereupon sent the case back to the
District Court. This decision stands for the important rule of admin-
istrative law that "he who decides must hear." 6 After the Secretary had
answered the allegations, the District Court held that, as a matter of
law, the Secretary had given Morgan that hearing to which he was
entitled under the Act.
7
Urging still further procedural deficiencies in the Secretary's pro-
ceedings, Morgan appealed again to the Supreme Court on the full
'42 Stat. 159 (1921), 7 U. S. C. A. § 181 et. seq. (1939).
5Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. 159, § 310, 7 U. S. C. A. 211 (1939):
"Whenever, after full hearing.., the Secretary is of the opinion that any rate ... is
or will be unjust..., the Secretary may determine and prescribe what will be the
just and reasonable rate.., to be thereafter observed in such case...." (italics
supplied).
8Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, So L. ed. 1288 (1936). The
court thought these allegations sufficient to require an answer of the Secretary
upon the question of whether Morgan had had a "full hearing," and sent the case
back to the District Court with the holding that the conclusiveness the law ascribed
to findings rested upon the assumption that the one who made the findings had
considered the evidence and reached his conclusion therefrom.
TMorgan v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 38o (1937). The court held that the
Secretary had read parts of the transcript of the testimony, the oral arguments and
the briefs submitted by Morgan. They held these facts to be proven unless the
court should "reject the testimony of the Secretary of Argiculture as incredible."
The court felt that the "alternative, absent a much stronger showing, than is
here, is not to be thought of in connection with the testimony of an honorable and
distinguished head of a great executive department of the Federal government."
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hearing issue. It was established that no brief was prepared by the
Secretary in the hearing preceding the order, and that no opportunity
was afforded to Morgan for an examination of the findings. He thus
had little information of the government's concrete claims until he
was served with the Secretary's final order. The Supreme Court, there-
fore, held the hearing to be fatally defective and the order of the
Secretary invalid.8
This decision was rendered in 1938. Meantime, in 1937, the Secre-
tary and Morgan had come to an agreement, and the latter was al-
lowed to raise his rates from December 1, 1937. Still undisposed of,
however, were the excess rates collected by Morgan and paid into the
court from 1933 until 1937; and, since the Secretary's order to charge
lower rates had been invalid, Morgan thought himself entitled to have
the impounded fund returned. He petitioned for a rehearing by the
Supreme Court for the return of that money, but the Court held that
the request was a matter for the court that held the funds.9
The Secretary now contended that by remedying the procedural
deficiencies he could validate the order as of the original date of its
issuance, 1933, and he therefore reopened proceedings to determine
what were reasonable rates during the period between 1933 and 1937.
Morgan considered the Secretary's investigation purely academic, and
the District Court concurred. With the observation that it failed to
perceive how the contention of the Secretary had "any shred of reason
or law to support it,"10 the court directed that the money be returned
to Morgan.
The Secretary, however, appealed to the Supreme Court, and the
majority of judges therein considered that any disposition of the fund
should await the results of the reopened proceedings before the
Secretary."' The Court held that the administrative order, although it
Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. ', 58 S. Ct. 773, 82 L. ed. 1129 (1938), re-
hearing denied, 504 U. S. 23. The Court held that a right to a hearing embraced
not only the right to present evidence, but also a reasonable opportunity to know
the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. It was further decided that Con-
gress, in requiring a "full hearing" had regard to judicial standards-not in any
technical sense but with respect to those "fundamental requirements of fairness"
which are of the essence in a proceeding of a judicial nature. Compare Local Gov-
ernment Board v. Ardildge, [1915] A. C. i2o, where the English court held that
only something called "natural justice" was necessary, and that it was not neces-
sary to have judicial procedure, but only a conscientious consideration of the case.
Morgan v. United States, 5o4 U. S. 23 (1938).
"Morgan v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 214, 215 (1938).
"United States v. Morgan, 3o7, U, S. 183, 59 S. Ct. 795, 83 L. ed, git (1939).
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had been held- invalid, was not a nullity.12 But of the three cases cited
as authority for this proposition, not one has concern with defective
administrative orders.' 3 Quite to the contrary, the Supreme Court has
frequently stated that when an administrative agency makes an inap-
propriate exercise of the powers delegated to it, the resulting order
is void.1
4
The decision of the Court to await the result of the reopened pro-
ceedings was, however, based upon equitable grounds, it being held
that the District Court was acting as a court of equity in the premises.
It was felt that if the Secretary's reinvestigation should show that the
rates ineffectively ordered to be charged between 1933 and 1937 were
now found to be just and reasonable by proper proceedings, it would
then be unjust and inequitable to allow Morgan to retain the excess.
. This disposition of the case placed the Secretary in a peculiarly
privileged position. A court of equity has no power to determine re-
troactive rates,15 but here the court in effect relegated the Secretary
to the position of a special master for just that purpose. Such action
is unprecedented, and its only attempted justification was couched in
the most vague and unpersuasive language.'8 It is certainly proper to
allow an administrative officer in 1939 to state his opinion on what
he believes would have been a good rate to have been charged in 1933,
but it is something else when he is allowed to give that opinion the
force of law. There is no practical difference whether it is changed from
"United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, x96, 59 S. Ct. 795, 8o2, 83 L. ed. 1211
(93g).
"Ewell v. Daggs, io8 U. S. 143, 2 S. Ct. 4o8, 27 L. ed. 682 (1883) (case involving
a usury statute of Texas and not oncerned with the administrative orders); Weeks
v. Bridgeman, 159 U. S. 541, 16 S. Ct. 72, 4o L. ed. 252 (1895) (no question of any
improper hearing making an administrative order valid or invalid); Toy Toy v.
Hopkins, U. S. Marshall, 212 U. S. 542, 29 S. Ct. 416, 53 L. ed. 644 (09o) (only held
that after the Circuit Court of Appeals had heard and passed on the evidence affect-
ing the jurisdiction, its judgment is open to review in the appellate court by writ
of error, but that its judgment could not be attached collaterally as absolutely void).
"The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 44 S. Ct. 317, 68 L. ed. 667 (1924);
Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 51 S. Ct. 119, 75 L. ed. 291 (1931).
"Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Arizona Grocery Co., 49 F. (2d) 563 (C. C. A.
9 th, z931). See particularly pages 568 and 569 and cases cited therein to the effect
that a legislative body, unlike a court, can establish such laws retroactively unless
they violate the due process clause. "... The commission, having established a
legal and lawful rate, -the freight charges thus ... collected become the property of
the carrier and cannot by a new retroactive law be taken away by legislative fiat."
""He [Secretary of Agriculture] was free to make an order fixing rates for the
future, and for that purpose or for any other within the purview of the Act he is
now free to determine a reasonable rate for the period antedating any order he may
now make." 307 U. S. 183, 192, 59 S. Ct. 795, 8oo, 83 L. ed. 1211 (1939).
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an opinion to a law by allowing the Secretary to issue an administrative
order effecting such a rate, or whether it is changed from an opinion
to a law by an equity court holding that the Secretary's opinion shall
set the court's standard for a just rate and, thereupon, dispose of the
impounded funds accordingly. In either case a nunc pro tunc order
is effected, all invalidating procedural deficiencies are removed, and
the "full hearing," made by statute a condition precedent to the
issuance of a valid order, is neatly circumvented.
It is hard to beleive that this escaped the notice of the Court, -and
that that high tribunal actually enabled the Secretary to do under the
guise of some vague, deceptive equitable concept that which would
have been improper and illegal for it to empower him to do through
his regular administrative channels. The opinion, however, indicates
that this may be true, for it is therein stated that the court and the
administrative bureau are to work together and cooperate to attain
the prescribed end of a statute.' 7 While this is true to a certain extent,
such collaboration should never operate so as to incline the court to-
ward the government as a party to litigation.
After this dubious decision, there was nothing to do but await the
results of the Secretary's reopened proceedings. In 1938, when he di-
rected that the rehearings be held, the Secretary ordered the "pro-
ceedings, findings of fact, conclusions and order" issued in June, 1933,
served upon Morgan as the "Tentative Findings of Fact, conclusion,
and proposed order of the Secretary." After argument, in 1939, the
Secretary entered a new order holding that the old rates and charges
collected during 1933 to 1937 were unjust and unreasonable, and pre-
scribing as just and reasonable, the identical rates (even to the fourth
decimal place) prescribed in the invalid order of 1933.18
The District Court refused to carry out the order and again di-
rected that the funds be returned to Morgan.' 9 The decision and the
17"... Court and agency are not to be regarded as wholly independent and un-
related instrumentalities of justice, each acting in the performance of its prescribed
statutory duties without regard to the appropriate function of the other in securing
the plainly indicated objects of the statute. Court and agency are the means
adapted to attain the prescribed end, and so far as their duties are defined by the
words of the statute, those words should be construed so as to attain that end
through coordinated action." Morgan v. United States, 307 U. S. 183, 191, 59 S. Ct.
795, 799, 83 L. ed. 1211 (1939).
"'This meant that the $586,ooo which Morgan had deposited with the District
Court, and which he claimed as vital to his business existence was to be returned
in some 1,870,000 items to the shippers who had paid it to Morgan. On an average
basis this amounts to less than 31 cents an item.
2'Morgan v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 546 (194o).
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reasoning therefor are very convincing. The court held that the Secre-
tary refused to avail himself of new data, and that at the new hearing,
nothing was added to the old record by the government, despite the
existence of overwhelming evidence that business variations had
necessarily wrought great change in the operations of the market. The
court considered it conclusively proved that the Secretary had made
no effort to ascertain the reasonableness of the rates during the im-
pounding period, and thus, because of a preconceived notion of his
power under the Act, had denied Morgan the fair hearing before an
impartial tribunal as required by the due process clause.20
Upon a new appeal to the Supreme Court, however, the Secretary
secured a reversal and had his order of 1933 upheld as effective to de-
termine the rates Morgan was to be allowed to charge as between 1933
and 1937. The Court held that the Secretary's findings conclusively
showed that his determinations represented a judgment of 1939 and
not a prophecy of 1933.21 The District Court had had just as strong
convictions that the conclusion represented a 1933 prophecy.
There seems to be only one case that can serve as authority for this
remarkable decision, Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Florida.22 The
fact situation there was somewhat similar. In 1928, the Interstate
Commerce Commission prescribed new and higher intrastate rates
for application in Florida by the defendant railroad. On the petition
of the shippers, the United States Supreme Court, in 1931, held the
order invalid because not supported by appropriate findings.23 Mean-
20A memorandum to the Secretary from the Administration of the Packers and
Stockyards Act told the Secretary of defects in the 1933 rate structure. The district
court believed that the submission of this memorandum which was ignored by the
Secretary, standing alone, but certainly in connection with the offers of proof by
Morgan, conclusively proved this preconceived notion of the Secretary that he had
power under the Act to issue the nunc pro tunc order and made no effort to as-
certain the reasonableness of rates during the impounding period.
The court concluded that it was clear from the record that the object of the
Secretary through the reopened proceedings was to procure the validation, nunc pro
tune, of the fatally defective order of 1933, and that he was of the opinion that
this was possible by merely going through a perfunctory argument.
21In holding the Secretary's job to be more than "merely to reflect the items on
a profit and loss statement," but one involving the "appraisal of elements having
delusive certainty," the court said: "It is not for us to try to penetrate the precise
course of the Secretary's reasoning. Our duty is at an end when we find, as we do
find, that the Secretary was responsibly conscious of conditions at the market dur-
ing the years following 1933, that he duly weighed them, and nevertheless con-
cluded that rates similar to those in the 1933 order were proper." Morgan v.
United States, 61 S. Ct. 999, 1003 (1941). "Similar" to the fourth decimal placel
"295 U. S. 301, 55 S. Ct. 713, 79 L. ed. 1451 (1935).
'2 Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1, 54 S. Ct. 603, 78 L. ed. 1077 (934).
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time, in 1929, the rates as prescribed had been put into effect and the
difference between the old and new rates was impounded, pending the
decision on the validity of the commission's order. After the order was
held invalid, the commission reopened the proceedings, made com-
prehensive findings, and entered the same order. The shippers sought
the return of the impounded funds, the difference between the old
railroad rate, and the higher rate charged under the invalid order of
the commission, but the Court refused the refund. The basis of the
refusal was the equitable nature of the proceeding. The following
passage of the opinion is an excellent embodiment of the whole ra-
tionale of this decision and, in part, the Morgan decision.
".... in the light of its present knowledge, the court will stay
its hand and leave the parties where it finds them .... To this
the claimants answer that inaction in such circumstances is an
assumption by the federal court of legislative powers.... The
argument misses the significance of equitable remedies. The
federal court .... does not undertake to say that the rates
collected by the carrier were lawful in the sense that a suit
would lie to recover them if credit had been given to the ship-
per and a balance were now unpaid. All that the federal court
does is to announce that it will stand aloof. It inquires whether
anything has happened whereby a court of equity would be
moved to impose equitable conditions upon equitable relief....
the charges were collected under color of legal right.... what
was charged would have been lawful as well as fair if there
had been no blunders of procedure, no administrative de-
lays... "24
Thus the railroad was allowed to keep the higher rate it had col-
lected under the invalid order. The Court implied that the shippers
individually might sue the railroad for the difference, but held that
the Court would not lend its aid toward return of the impounded
fund. If it be assumed that the decision in the Railroad case 25 was
proper, a serious question still remains as to whether it will support
the decision in the Morgan case. The former decision is representative
of a fundamental practice of the court of equity-i.e., refusal to act
where to lend its aid would work an injustice. In the Morgan case,
however, the Court did lend its aid; it did more than simply leave
the parties where it found them. It ordered money deposited by
2'Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 3o, 314-315, 55 S. Ct.
713, 713-5, 79 L. ed. 1451 (1935). (Italics supplied).
2'Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 301, 55 S. Ct. 713, 79 L. ed.
1451 (1935)-
1941]
100 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. III
Morgan to be returned to other persons.2 6 In the Morgan case, the
Court did not ignore the distinction of the two cases as one of judicial
inaction as against action, but it again justified its holding in delusive
terms. It felt that because of the actual "posture" of the case, it was
under a self-imposed duty to act by virtue of having taken the fund
into its possession.27 Assignment of the different "posture" of the case
as justification for positive equitable action is deceptive in its intended
inference that the principles involved in the two cases are the same
and that the only difference is in the position of the parties. There is
a great deal more difference than this, however, between the equitable
inaction in the Railroad case and the equitable action in the Morgan
case. In the Railroad case the inaction may only deny a type of remedy;
but, in the Morgan case postive equitable action operates to determine
a substantive right-i.e., the return of the money to the shippers and
a preclusion of any chance of Morgan's recovering.
Noticeably absent, also, was a recognition of the difference in de-
gree between the Railroad and the Morgan cases. In the former the
order was held invalid merely because the findings were not drawn up
properly. In the Morgan case, however, the whole procedure by which
the full hearing was attempted was improper. This is a distinction at
least worthy of notice, if not sufficient to alter the result.
In each of these cases, the Court delved into the realm of abstract
justice and made dispositions of the cases extra-legally on that basis.
The point missed, however, is that there is no such thing as art ab-
stractly unjust or unreasonable rate. There cannot be an unjust rate
until it is properly so called by the legislature or its delegate. In these
instances, the legislature of the United States delegated the power to
administrative agencies. The only way for the agencies in either case
to find a rate unjust was to accord those concerned a full hearing. Until
this was done there could exist no unjust or illegal rate. When it was
"Those series of transactions must be considered the acts of Morgan-the
shippers paying to Morgan and Morgan impounding the excess funds. See 307 U. S.
183, 185, 59 S. Ct. 795, 83 L. ed. 1211 (1939) for the impounding order. Morgan
cannot be considered as the agent of the shippers here.
2'The Court felt that had the shippers paid to Morgan instead of to the court,
the Secretary could have ordered a return to the shippers, but here the Court
missed a fact because the shippers did pay Morgan and Morgan paid the money
into court. Besides, the Court failed to give any reason or to cite any authority for
this proposition. It would seem to be directly in conflict with the Railroad case if
the Secretary could direct a return to the shippers. The alleged justification for the
Morgan decision, then, is that the Court has power to correct that which has been
wrongfully done "by virtue of its process," but in this instance, at least, the
Court's consiousness of its wrong-doing was unwarranted.
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done it only made the rate unjust as of that date. The rate of the day
before, though mathematically equal, remained absolutely just and
equitable.
In the Morgan case, a valid order was not made until after the rates
had been changed. It is difficult to see how the later valid order can
apply retroactively to affect rates in force prior to its existence. Al-
though the later order was supported sufficiently by evidence, this
was not true of the first. The administrative official may not rely upon
evidence taken in a former proceeding on an entirely different issue.
Congress gave the Secretary alone power to find injustice in the rates;
it did not give such power to the courts.28 The assumption of equitable
power in the Morgan case seems unsupportable and to amount to
nothing less than a nunc pro tunc validation of a former invalid ad-
ministrative order.
29
It is difficult to see what incentive lies in the decisions of the
Morgan and Railroad cases toward making a commission conduct a
fair hearing or fulfill any other formal conditions put upon its power
of fixing rates. Indeed the incentive runs the other way. Upon a gesture
or mere pretense of meeting procedural requirements, the commission
might issue its order, confident that when it "got around to it," per-
haps years later, it could fulfill these mere formalities by making
proper findings and according to those affected a full hearing, and
thereby validate the order ab initio. Since the administrative agency
must necessarily have so much power with regard to finality of its
factual determinations,3 0 it seems essential that courts, instead of
"Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 301, 327-8, 55 S. Ct. 713,
724, 79 L. ed. 1451 (1935). Roberts, J., dissenting.
21A legislative body, unlike a court, can establish rates retroactively unless it
amounts to taking of property without due process of law. Rates collected under
an existing schedule cannot by later retroactive law be taken from the collector.
The Supreme Court has adopted this view. See Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T.
& S. F. Py., 284 U. S. 370, 52 S. Ct. 183, 76 L. ed. 384 (1932), which declares that it
has been upheld by a majority of the state courts. It is true that so long as the rate
existed the shipper was bound to pay it, but later, upon its being shown invalid,
he should be allowed reparation. If instead of asking reparation in both the Morgan
and the Railroad cases, separate actions had been instiuted against the collector
of the rate, there would have been a prime facia case for recovery, and the plea of
the void order would not have been allowed as a defense. See dissent of Mr. Justice
Roberts in Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 3Ol, 3x8, 55 S. Ct.
713, 720, 79 L. ed. x451 (1935).
8OThis raises another point pressed in the Morgan case, and the conclusions of
the Court upon it are right and proper. It is upon the question of the finality to be
given to the administrative proceedings. On this point, it must be taken as settled
that the judicial inquiry into the facts goes no further than to ascertain whether
19411
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countenancing questionable methods, should apply strict sanctions to
compel the agency to proceed properly.
WIIAsM M. MARTIN
there is any evidence to support the findings, and that all questions as to weight of
evidence lie within the determination of the agency. Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v.
United States, 28o U. S. 420, 50 S. Ct. 22o, 74 L. ed. 524 (193o); Fayerweather v.
Ritch, 195 U. S. 276, 25 S. Ct. 58, 49 L. ed. 193 (19o4). Certainly evidence existed in
the Morgan case in sufficient quantities to enable the Secretary to make the find-
ings he did.
The administrative agency from its very nature must be trusted. If the evidence
is presented to the examiner and brought to his attention, it is beyond the poor
power of any man to say whether the examiner weighed the evidence and appraised
it. As was said by Otis, J., dissenting in Morgan v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 546, 556
at 558, 561 (194o): "... there is no satisfactory way under heaven to dislodge a
biased and prejudiced agency .. .. and where the decision of the agency, so func-
tioning, as to every issue of fact, if supported by any evidence (however defiant of
the weight of the evidence), is made as conclusive as the command of a despot....
The remedy, if the Secretary shall violate his duty, is by appeal to the President
to remove him or to the Court of Impeachment."
102
